“A terrorist attack in a U.S. port would send economic ripples around the world … The Dow would drop at least 500 points and cost the U.S. economy $ 58 billion.”

Those were the words used by the DHS spokesman last week when addressing the Warehousing Education and Research Council. The spokesman wasn’t being too accurate, however. In the “Congressional Research Service Report for Congress”, which we cited in our Vol. II, Art. 24 commentary, it clearly states that a terrorist nuclear bomb “detonated in a major seaport would kill 50,000 to 1 million people and would result in direct property damage of $ 50 billion to $ 500 billion, losses due to trade disruption of $ 100 billion to $ 200 billion, and direct costs of $ 300 billion to $ 1.2 trillion.”

When you consider what we have at risk, and what we are spending in an illogical attempt to prevent those losses, shouldn’t some of our Congressional representatives step forward and suggest a more in-depth review of what some of them are calling an inevitable event? Isn’t there a better way, a more reliable way, of dealing with this threat? If throwing money at the threat isn’t removing the threat, why spend anything at all?

Let’s look again at that theoretical $ 58 billion, or $ 1.2 trillion, or whatever, as well as the daily millions we’re throwing away. Let’s recognize that the proper way to prevent a homeland catastrophe would be to locate the threat and “cut it off at the pass”. Our first step should be to concentrate our efforts on designing an infallible method of detecting the threat while still offshore and well before it’s within the territorial limits of the U.S. The followup would be to settle upon an equally infallible method of destroying the threat. The U.S. Navy, you’ll recall, employed this two-step strategy when forced to deal with hostile submarines. “Hunter-killer” aircraft were paired up in the beginning and even this tactic was refined by designing aircraft that had dual capabilities. The strategy was infallible. So was the execution. It was the simplest way to approach the problem, and this website began promoting such a program in our Vol. II, Art. 19 commentary:

“Our shipboard systems: Although this website is dedicated to terminal operations, if ultimate security is ever required, it can be obtained by means of our shipboard storage and retrieval system. Our “Chronology” page makes reference to U.S. Patent Number 5,860,783, Granted on Jan. 19, 1999, and Entitled: CARGO CONTAINER STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM AND METHOD INCLUDING ON DECK CARRIAGE ASSEMBLY. This shipboard system makes it possible to retrieve, or store, any single container, regardless of its location aboard the vessel, without handling any other container. As an added advantage, the system allows for the scanning/inspection of every container while the vessel is enroute to our shores. The procedure can be completed in one week’s time, and prior to arrival at our ports every safe container will be granted clearance, and any suspect containers may very well be jettisoned. The threat to “deepsix” offenders will be enough to discourage terrorists and any others who would wish to gain illegal access into our country. [Checkmate!!]” Infallible! And the cost? A lot less than $ 50 billion or $ 1.2 trillion.